7 jours d'après - tour 2

Meet the new boss / Same as the old boss

The Who,
Won't Get Fooled Again
Who's Next June 25, 1971 (Polydor)

More than any campaign blandishments, Sarko's cabinet picks will tell just how much purported change France must endure.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE LIMITED TO 15 MEMBERS

Well, this sounded like a promising improvement over the current cabinet population (32). Alas, the headline tally does not include the gaggle of ministres délégués, scil., the deputy ministers, who will be appointed after the June legislative elections .

May 7, 2007 (Figaro) - Michele Alliot-Marie [former dimmest bulb in the dark Chirac marquee, and here], who dreamed of being prime minister, seems set to swap defence for another coveted post: the Foreign Ministry. That is if it does not go to Alain Juppe [and this]. But it seems that the former prime minister is more tempted by the presidency of the National Assembly. With Alliot-Marie at the Quai d'Orsay, Michel Barnier [and here and here] could replace her at the Defence Ministry. The name of Philippe Douste-Blazy [current dimmest bulb in the dark Chirac marquee, and here and here and here and here and here, and here, and here] is also being cited for this job.

That so many stalwart chiraquiens are in the mix is disappointing. That M. Douste-Blazy should be considered for anything is astonishing.

And then there is this.

HUBERT VÉDRINE APERÇU SORTANT
DES BUREAUX DE NICOLAS SARKOZY
[HUBERT VÉDRINE SEEN LEAVING
THE OFFICES OF NICOLAS SARKOZY]
11 mai 2007 (Le Monde)

NICOLAS SARKOZY AURAIT APPROCHÉ
HUBERT VÉDRINE POUR LE QUAI D'ORSAY
[NICOLAS SARKOZY SAID TO HAVE APPROACHED
HUBERT VÉDRINE FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTRY]

12 mai 2007 (Le Monde) - Le président élu français Nicolas Sarkozy a proposé à Hubert Védrine, ancien ministre de Lionel Jospin, d'être le prochain ministre des affaires étrangères de son gouvernement, et ce dernier y "réfléchit", a-t-on appris, vendredi 11 mai, de sources concordantes.

... Patrick Devedjian, conseiller politique du président de l'UMP, n'a pas exclu, vendredi, la nomination d'Hubert Védrine si ce dernier "est d'accord" avec la politique extérieure prônée par le président élu. "Quand on entre dans le gouvernement, c'est qu'on est d'accord pour mettre en œuvre le projet présidentiel", a expliqué le député des Hauts-de-Seine.

[French president-elect Nicolas Sarkozy proposed to Hubert Védrine, former minister of Lionel Jospin, to be the next Foreign Minister of his government, and that the latter "reflects", as reported Friday May 11 by corroborating sources.

... Friday Patrick Devedjian, adviser political of the president of UMP, did not rule out the appointment of Hubert Védrine if the latter "agrees" with the foreign policy preached by the president-elect. "When one enters the government, one agrees to advance the presidential project", explained the Hauts-de-Seine deputy.]

[Emphasis in the original.]

And just who is Hubert Védrine? M. Védrine is a former Socialist adviser to President Mitterand and a foreign minister in the government of Lionel Jospin. M. Védrine, for those who remember, is remembered as the neologist of "hyperpuissance", a signal word for an America that France considered too big, too strong, and too influential. He is a key architect of France's back-door plan for greatness -- a multipolar world of competing "poles", each with France at its center.

Writing for the Hoover Institute in 2000, a benighted Christopher Caldwell describes an economically vibrant France in the warm embrace of globalization (la France qui gagne), but ready to rewrite the rules to better favor France. Although Mr. Caldwell's bright France did not pan out, he does give a good account of Védrinism.

The cornerstone of [M. Védrine's] new thinking is the collection of non-governmental political activists who increasingly move politics around the world — feminists, tax protesters, World Trade Organization paranoids, runners of privatized social services. He also keeps an eye on the crypto-governmental powers of the mass media and an activist judiciary.

… Védrine calls these institutions "international civil society." In describing them, he sounds like a cross between the Montesquieu he dreams of and the Machiavelli he is. He recognizes that this civil society is "for now, less codified, less regulated, less transparent than traditional powers." On one hand that makes it more free. On the other, that makes it less democratic, as well as culturally imperialistic, since "the most influential civil societies are necessarily those of the most powerful countries." No matter: International civil society will be the tool France uses to "civilize" or "humanize" globalism.

... With the end of the superpower rivalry, the United States has become, to use the term that is Védrine’s contribution to the French language, an hyperpuissance, or "hyperpower." Védrine nowadays never uses the word without adding that, in French, the prefix hyper- lacks the associations it has in English with disease (really big French supermarkets are called hypermarchés), but that doesn’t mean that the term is used in a friendly way. Védrine is absolutely explicit about turning Europe into a second "pole" to counter American influence. France may not be a hyperpower, but it is one of seven countries Védrine identifies as "powers of global influence" — the others are Britain, Germany, Russia, China, Japan, and (maybe) India. The three big European states could provide plausible competition for the United States.

In theory, there’s nothing anti-American about Védrine’s wish to see Europe play a larger role on the world’s stage, particularly its cultural stage.

But the idea that NATO used to proclaim of a "Euro-Atlantic world" strikes him as bunk. The differences between the States and Europe are wider than ever, he thinks, and these differences will lend France’s language, culture, and political institutions a "seduction effect" in the eyes of those sated with American products — provided his countrymen can hang in there and guard their cultural independence. "The fear of uniformity," he says, "will reinforce a need for diversity, and thus, among other things, a need for French" [la France qui gagne—contre les États-Unis]. Védrine admits — even lauds — the strength of American culture. He grants that the "quasi-monopoly conquered by American cultural industries [was] obtained through a vitality that none will deny, a creativity that everyone recognizes and admires." But he adds, "That rhetoric doesn’t oblige us to be swamped by a cultural tidal wave."

This is not for domestic consumption only. It’s an appeal to all the world’s cultures to accept French leadership in a global cultural battle. Védrine claims that democratization will be more effective if it’s not perceived merely as Westernization or Americanization... "To demand perfect democracy right away is to think in religious terms," Védrine says. "If you think that way — dogmatically — you’re logically led to think in terms of sanctions, punishments, excommunications and anathemas. That’s not my style." Furthermore, France cannot afford to think religiously about democracy. "If we’re only allowed to associate with friends who are comme il faut," Védrine continues, "who think like us, we might as well renounce the possibility of acting on any problem at all, of resolving the slightest crisis — and leave the field to the United States." ... There is an idealistic side to Védrine’s democracy theorizing — under his foreign policy leadership, for instance, France has been far tougher than the U.S. on what he calls Russia’s "Potemkin democracy." But there is a pragmatic side to Védrinism, too. France cannot compete against America if the battle for Third World hearts and minds is carried out through rubber-stamped U.S. conferences, aid packages, heavily staffed embassies, and projection of military power.

[Plain italics in original. Bold italics added.]

Of course, what is bunk are the many underlying assumptions of Védrinism.

That France wants to compete in some multipolar configuration with America is fair enough. Védrinism, though, is little more than opposing America for being America, its strategy little more than isolating a lonely America.

But America is not lonely. Of the "powers of global influence" given by M. Védrine above, America arguably has stronger ties than France with more than half. Just what is the "seductive" French appeal that will peel Japan away from America? This is some dreamy arrogance on M. Védrine's part and betrays a zero understanding of Japan, its American relationship, and its political culture. That M. Védrine thinks France can "seduce" Russia and China into French schemes to serve French interests, well, that is to think France very clever indeed. Even M. Védrine probably does not think himself that clever, which is why Védrinism fishes about amongst smaller nations or where anti-Americanism is already rooted, sparing Védrinism the spadework.

And while Védrinism touts "diversity", it envisions knitting everybody up in world institutions of governance, regulation, and oversight, which, needless to say, are to be dominated by French "guidance". Again this is to think France very clever indeed.

Védrinism hopes to convert middling France into the hyperpuissance, not by virtue of any actual power intrinsically possessed, but by connivance so massive and mazy as to be silly.

HUBERT VÉDRINE "RÉSERVE SA RÉPONSE" POUR LE QUAI D’ORSAY
[HUBERT VÉDRINE "RESERVES HIS RESPONSE" FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTRY]
12 mai 2007 (Figaro)

We can only hope he says no.

So much for all the gush being gushed in a wishful American press.

OUR NEW AMI SALUTES AMERICA THE BEAUTIFUL
PARIS May 7, 2007 (NYPost)

It would appear that whatever else Sarko may ask the French to endure, they will not be asked to endure America-friendliness.

PFFT (What is this?): Same-old same-old 3¾ | Rayonnement français 0